An organization created for the purpose of carrying out terrorist activity or acknowledging the possibility of using terrorism in its activity. The active subdivisions of a terrorist organization, through which it achieves its goals, are terrorist groups.
Paradoxically, terrorism, as an antisocial phenomenon that has accompanied human history since pre-biblical times, acquired a planet-wide scale precisely at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century.
Some are inclined to see in this one of the negative side effects of the process of globalization of inter-civilizational ties.
Be that as it may, this universal tragedy did not bypass our country either.
In the West it is sometimes customary to emphasize that Russia supposedly became the ancestral home of this universal madness. Which is true only in part, since political terrorism did indeed gain a certain prevalence in Russia in the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries.
It should however be emphasized that the emergence of political terrorism in Russia was not something unique in the Europe of that time: terrorist ideas and concepts developed in the works of German, Italian, French and other European radicals, and exerted a noticeable influence on the minds and moods of our compatriots.
The influence of radical ideas from abroad was established by the investigation both in the case of D.V. Karakozov, who committed the first terrorist attempt on Alexander II on 4 April 1866, and his Moscow like-minded associates (the "Ishutinists"), and in the case of the associates of S.G. Nechayev.
The other matter is that, as a result of a whole complex of causes, adherence to terrorist "methods of struggle" took deep roots here.
The ideas of S.G. Nechayev, N.N. Morozov and other Narodnaya Volya members born in our country at that time, and then the political practice of the "Combat Organization" of the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries in 1902–1907, became the initial ideological base, the theoretical foundation of "left", or more precisely "leftist" terrorism, which became widespread abroad in the middle of the last century.
It should be noted that the phenomenon of political terrorism attracted the attention of domestic researchers as early as during its emergence in the mid-19th century.
Its first researchers were S.S. Tatishchev and A.P. Malshinsky, attached to the Third Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery.
And if the first "fundamental" domestic criminological study of political terrorism can be considered the work of N.N. Golitsyn, "Chronicle of the Socialist Movement in Russia. 1878–1887. Official Report.", prepared in 1888, then the next was the book by General of the Separate Corps of Gendarmes A.I. Spiridovich, "The Party of Socialist Revolutionaries and Its Predecessors", which went through two editions in 1916 and 1918.
It should also be emphasized that the aforementioned and other first domestic studies of the phenomenon of terrorism were characterized by an understanding of its social conditioning, in connection with which the "prescriptions" for treating this "bad disease of society" were by no means limited only to repressive measures.
We specifically draw attention to these circumstances, since, in our opinion, the destructive-destructive, socially criminal phenomenon of "left" terrorism has by no means yet become a thing of the past and has not exhausted its destructive potential.
One should only not mistakenly personify the Russian Social Democrats (Bolsheviks) with the adherents and apologists of "revolutionary terrorism".
In our conviction, recourse to terrorism in all the diversity of its activity-related criminal manifestations is preceded by profound spiritual, moral and psychological transformations of the personality, which must be taken into account in order to organize an effective system of counteraction and criminological prevention of terrorism.
And, although some readers may not believe me, my colleagues in the security services, and today's employees of the FSB of Russia, did and are doing a great deal so that, by methods of preventive influence, certain of our fellow citizens would not embark upon an unquestionably criminal path of activity. Preventing not only senseless bloodshed, but also saving the lives and destinies of those who might have resolved upon truly suicidal, reckless and senseless criminal acts.
A new outbreak of politically motivated violence, which not infrequently took the form of terrorism, occurred in Russia after the October Revolution of 1917, and then in the 30s. Soviet state security agencies were directed to combat terrorist manifestations.
After the end of the Great Patriotic War, in order to combat terrorism, a special Department "T" ("combating terror") was formed in 1946 within the structure of the new Ministry of State Security (MGB).
All MGB subunits that received relevant information about the existence of terrorist designs or intentions were required to transmit it to this department, which determined the further course of the investigation — either taking it up itself, or giving instructions on it to the subunit that had first obtained the initial data.
A considerable number of cases and signals, as well as terrorist acts, in the late 40s and early 50s occurred in the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, as well as the Baltic republics, where nationalist undergrounds and the associated "insurgent" "resistance" groups (the "forest brothers") survived and continued to operate.
Not infrequently the "actions" of the "resistance groups" took the character of combat clashes with the militia and Red Army garrisons, in the course of which civilians perished, including children, women and the elderly. Since some of the aforementioned "insurgent groups" had ties with the special services of foreign states — primarily Great Britain — work in this area of counterintelligence activity was directed by Department 2-N of the Second Main Directorate of the MGB of the USSR.
After the formation in March 1954 of the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, this department became the 2nd Department of the 4th Directorate.
Later, during the reorganization of the KGB structure in February 1960, the staff and functions of this department, like those of other subunits of the directorate, were transferred to the 2nd Main Directorate.
The task of combating possible terrorist manifestations was assigned to all subunits of the KGB agencies, but there was no longer a single accounting and coordinating body for organizing counteraction to terrorism within the Committee's central apparatus.
These reorganizations testify that the number and scale of terrorist manifestations was insignificant. There were, it is true, isolated instances of attempted assassinations of elected party officials, chairmen of collective farms and village soviets, other local "nomenklatura" state or public figures, representatives of authority, which initially might be classified as a "terrorist act." However, subsequently, upon examination of the subjective side of these acts, they as a rule received a different criminal-law classification.
Thus, on August 8, 1980, in the settlement of Cholpon-Ata not far from Frunze (now the city of Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan), the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of that republic, S.Sh. Ibraimov, was killed, which was initially classified as a "terrorist act." In reality, as the investigation established, he became the victim of a mentally ill person.
The general guideline in terms of counteracting terrorist manifestations, which was set before all subunits of the KGB agencies, was the organization of work to prevent the theft of weapons and ammunition and to search for stolen weapons and ammunition, and to suppress their illegal circulation on the territory of the USSR.
One of the first acts of terrorism after the formation of the KGB of the USSR was the shooting of those present on the festive tribune during the demonstration of May 1, 1955, in Arkhangelsk, as a result of which 3 people died.
This tragic event was followed by corresponding orders of the Chairman of the KGB, which demanded greater attention to incoming signals about terrorist intentions and to control over the safekeeping of weapons and ammunition.
The next act of terrorism, which received considerable publicity, was the shooting on January 22, 1968, by Junior Lieutenant V. Ilyin, who had deserted from his unit, at the government motorcade by the Borovitsky Gate of the Kremlin, as a result of which a driver — an employee of the KGB protection directorate — died.
The investigation continued for about a year and a half, after which the terrorist was sent for compulsory psychiatric treatment (subsequently Ilyin himself did not deny that he had a mental illness and, by his own admission, "has no complaints against the employees of the KGB agencies").
However, even before this tragic incident, within the KGB system, in its 5th Directorate, in July 1967, a 5th Department was formed, which was charged with the function of preventing and suppressing terrorist acts and intentions.
Upon the formation of the 5th Directorate, in accordance with Order No. 0096 of the Chairman of the KGB of July 25, 1967, its 5th Department was assigned the following tasks:
— providing practical assistance to local KGB agencies in preventing mass antisocial manifestations;
— searching for the authors of anonymous anti-Soviet documents — leaflets, "proclamations," "appeals," instructions, etc. — containing threats or calls to commit state crimes or violent unlawful actions;
— verifying and organizing work on signals about the harboring of terrorist intentions.
In creating this department, the KGB leadership proceeded from the premise that terrorist acts could be the consequence of hostile ideological influence on certain social groups and individual citizens involved in various kinds of negative social processes, and also caused by "imitation" of foreign terrorist groups that were very actively operating both in the Middle East and in the FRG, Great Britain and France.
In this department, F.D. Bobkov emphasized, a complete unified database was being created on terrorist moods, intentions and manifestations, and on the progress of work on specific operational cases.
Regarding the search for the authors of anonymous documents containing threats to carry out terrorist acts, F.D. Bobkov noted that, as experience showed, they should be taken seriously, since quite often their perpetrators announced their intentions by sending out anonymous demands or ultimatums. V. Ilyin, who in December 1968 carried out an attempt on L.I. Brezhnev's motorcade, began with the sending of anonymous threats. A. Shmonov, who shot at M.S. Gorbachev on Red Square on November 7, 1990, began the same way.
Insufficient attention to the threats expressed sometimes ended in tragedies.
Another senseless bloody act was the massacre committed on September 8, 1968, by two deserters at the railway station in Kursk, as a result of which 8 people died, including 4 hostages.
On the same day, Radio Liberty reported that this criminal act was allegedly a "revolt of those who disagreed with the introduction of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia."
The organization of work on signals about possible terrorist actions on the part of foreign citizens continued to remain with the VGU of the KGB (in the late 70s it was assigned to the 11th Department, which quite often carried out operational measures together with the 7th Department of the 5th Directorate).
Later, in August 1969, on the basis of the "anti-terrorist" section of the 5th Department, an independent 7th Department was formed, whose functions were defined as "identifying and checking persons harboring the intention to use explosives and explosive devices for anti-Soviet purposes."
This unit was tasked with identifying and searching for the authors of anonymous anti-Soviet documents containing threats of a terrorist nature, as well as with the operational investigation and prevention of the hostile activity of persons harboring terrorist intentions. Here, in the form of control-observation files (KND), information was concentrated on the operational investigations conducted by the territorial KGB organs. Also, employees of the department quite often went on trips to provide assistance to investigators in the field.
Over the years of the existence of the 5th Directorate of the KGB, wrote F.D. Bobkov, it was possible to prevent many intentions to use explosive devices, but in five cases this could not be done.
The 7th Department of the 5th Directorate concentrated the entire database received by the KGB organs through various channels concerning terrorist sentiments, intentions and actions. Although, to be fair, it should be said that the volume of its work bears no comparison with the avalanche of terrorist threats that befell Russia from 1992 onward.
In setting tasks for countering terrorist manifestations, the KGB leadership proceeded from the assumption that such cruel, thoughtless acts could be both a consequence of targeted foreign ideological influence on individual citizens of our country, and a consequence of various kinds of negative social processes, an exceptional confluence of unfavorable personal circumstances, the influence of various kinds of criminogenic factors, as well as the presence of causes and conditions conducive to the commission of crimes.
The latter direction — the criminological prevention of criminal manifestations, to which he constantly drew the attention of the leadership and operational staff — was present in the activities of all subunits of the KGB of the USSR.
S.V. Chertoprud, in one of the books devoted to Yu.V. Andropov, wrote that "in the 60s — 70s of the last century a reverse process began — the preparation of the social base of terrorism."
While agreeing that in the 70s in the USSR a certain growth of social tension did indeed begin, to which the chairman of the KGB, Yu.V. Andropov, repeatedly drew the attention of his colleagues in the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, nevertheless, it is hardly possible to agree with the rather categorical assessment of negative social processes in the USSR that is given.
At the same time, already at a meeting of the leadership of the KGB of the USSR on June 22, 1971, along with the expansion of the scale of intelligence activity of the special services of the leading imperialist states against the USSR, Yu.V. Andropov emphasized the aspiration of foreign anti-Soviet centers to incite part of the population to extremism, mass disorders, and terrorism. Which was supposed to demonstrate to the foreign "public the disagreement" and active "protest" of the population of the socialist countries against the policies of the communist parties.
And the process of growing social tension, to the monitoring of which and the advance identification of "centers of social excitement" Andropov pointed the chekists, was connected both with the emergence of social and economic problems in the USSR and with the "new course" of the administration of J. Carter, which adopted a course toward the "protection of human rights throughout the world."
The author of these lines, back in 1998, in a work prepared on the order of the Security Council of Russia, wrote that "one should not think that, supposedly, in the USSR there existed no certain problems in the sphere of the observance and realization of human rights, just as similar problems have always existed and exist in all countries of the world. The other thing is that their acuteness and scale bear no comparison with what our citizens had to experience and endure later, in the years of the "perestroika" that had begun.
Also, one of the manifestations of the objective process of globalization was the dissemination of information about terrorist acts committed abroad by Palestinian, Italian, West German, French and Latin American terrorists, many of whom positioned themselves as "leftist," "communist forces of resistance to imperialist reaction."
After all, it is precisely at the beginning of the 70s of the last century that the intensification of the terrorist activity of ETA in Spain, the "Red Brigades" in Italy, the "Red Army Faction" (RAF) in the FRG, the JRA in Japan, "Action Directe" in France, the IRA in Great Britain and similar organizations falls, whose example and demagogic appeals and "proclamations," according to the assessments of the chekists, could cause "imitation" in our country as well.
Which testified both to the significant internationalization of all socio-political processes in the world and to the need to take this factor into account in the interests of ensuring the national and state security of the country.
Only after a little more than thirty years did this objectively existing and still existing phenomenon receive the name "process of globalization," which to this day causes no little anxiety, unrest and dispute.
As early as 1975, Andropov noted with alarm: "At present, political assassinations, hostage-taking, abductions of diplomats, and hijackings of aircraft have become more frequent in the West. Paradoxically, it is precisely in recent times that terror as a means of political struggle has begun to revive again. The method of terrorism is openly propagandized by the official press of anti-Soviet centers. Of course, as a method of political struggle, terrorism is an expression of despair and doom. But its danger does not become any less because of this. We, the Chekists, must know precisely not only by whom and for what purpose terror has been taken up as a weapon, but also, and especially well, the methods of practically suppressing terrorist acts."
And, unfortunately, the unfavorable assessments and forecasts of the Chekists were beginning to come true.
Since the seizure of civilian aircraft ("hijacking") was the most widespread form of terrorist manifestations in the USSR, it seems necessary to dwell on this problem in greater detail.
In the late 60s, acts of seizing aircraft at airports or in flight, which, according to the international conventions of ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization), are acts of terrorism ("air terrorism"), became the most widespread in the world.
Despite the fact that the first case of seizing a scheduled aircraft occurred as early as February 11, 1931, in Peru. And the first act of destroying an aircraft in the air, as a result of which passengers and crew died, was carried out in May 1948. (Until August 2004, our country had not encountered such tragedies.)
It should be especially noted that the wave of acts of "air terrorism" in the world begins after the relatively successful, for the terrorists, seizures by militants of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) of a Boeing 707 in Athens on July 23, 1968, and on June 22, 1970, by "fighters" of the Palestinian Front of the People's Struggle (FPS) of a scheduled aircraft from Beirut, which received the broadest coverage in the world media.
At the same time, not a few acts of air terrorism were committed by members of various Palestinian "liberation" organizations.
This practice was transferred to us from abroad: the actions of the Palestinians were widely covered by the press and aroused considerable interest among those who harbored criminal intentions.
On June 3, 1969, an armed group of three anti-Soviet-minded residents of Leningrad seized an Il-14 aircraft operating an internal flight on the Leningrad-Tallinn route (this fact was not reported in the Soviet press at the time, since the terrorist act was quickly suppressed by the forces of the aircraft's own crew. All four crew members were awarded the Orders of the Red Banner and the Red Star).
In total, in the USSR from 1954 to 1994, about one hundred attempts to seize aircraft are known, the overwhelming majority of which were suppressed without bloodshed.
The first attempt to seize an aircraft in the USSR was carried out as early as January 8, 1954, and in subsequent years this tragic chronicle of attempts to seize aircraft took the following form:
October 25, 1958 - an attempt to seize an An-2 aircraft in Yakutia (the hijackers were convicted);
July 21, 1964, an attempt to seize an An-2 in Ashgabat (no casualties);
October 29, 1964, an An-2 on the Kishinev-Izmail flight;
August 3, 1966, the crew of an An-2 on the Batumi-Poti flight neutralized a criminal in the air.
Despite the fact that the seizure of aircraft with the presentation of demands for ransom and the provision of a flight abroad under the threat of reprisals against passengers took place in the 70s-80s of the last century, these actions should not, however, be interpreted as a "manifestation of political opposition in the USSR."
As Doctor of Law M.P. Kireev noted on this matter, a criminological analysis of attempts to seize airliners shows that more than 70% of the seizures pursued mercenary goals, including about 25% of them were committed by criminals, including for the purpose of hiding abroad from previously committed crimes; more than 20% were carried out by mentally ill persons, and only the actions of approximately 10% of the "terrorists" had one or another "political" motivation for their criminal actions.
On June 15, 1970, the KGB Directorate at Leningrad airport suppressed an attempt to hijack an An-2 aircraft from Leningrad to Sweden by a group of 16 "Israeli refuseniks" led by E. Kuznetsov and M. Dymshits - one of the first acts of air terrorism in the USSR, which gained wide fame in the country and in the world. For the sake of historical truth, it must also be said that the members of the group managed to establish preliminary contact with Israeli special services, which strongly recommended not to undertake such an adventurous action, fraught with many unpredictable consequences.
In December 1970, the members of the group were convicted by the Leningrad City Court. The sentence of capital punishment for E. Kuznetsov and M. Dymshits was replaced by maximum terms of imprisonment. But as early as 1979, three members of the group were exchanged for Soviet citizens arrested in the USA[15].
We will return to the external sources of the terrorist threat later, but for now let us note that the most widely known in the USSR at that time was the seizure and hijacking to Turkey on October 15, 1970, during departure from Batumi airport, of an An-14 aircraft.
The aircraft was seized by father and son Brazinskas, armed with a sawed-off shotgun and a grenade. At the same time, the 19-year-old stewardess N.V. Kurchenko was killed. Turkey, and following it the USA, where the hijackers were "exported," declared the Brazinskases "political refugees" and refused to hand them over to Soviet justice.
This seizure of an aircraft became the first widely known case of air terrorism in the USSR, which until that moment had been quite widespread in the West.
In 2004, the younger Brazinskas was convicted in the USA for the murder of his father.
On November 13 of that same 1970, there followed the hijacking of an L-202 aircraft to Turkey; the terrorists were again not handed over, and on November 13 an attempt at yet another seizure of an aircraft was made.
In this connection, not only were the mechanisms for ensuring the safety of civil aviation flights improved, but for the first time, on January 3, 1973, by a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, acts of seizing an aircraft were criminalized (the introduction of Article 211-3 into the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and analogous articles into the criminal codes of other union republics).
Along with the territorial organs of the KGB of the USSR, called upon to prevent the preparation of a seizure of an aircraft, the last defensive "line" for ensuring aviation security were the Committee's subunits in transport.
However, it should also be said that certain tragic events — emergencies with human casualties, accidents and catastrophes — were not only perceived by public opinion as possible terrorist acts, but were also investigated accordingly.
Thus, in the spring of 1968, a powerful explosion claimed the lives of about 100 residents of the city of Kirov (it was a consequence of a violation of safety rules).
On February 25, 1977, a fire broke out in the now-demolished largest hotel in the capital, the Rossiya, in which the notorious "human factor" and the violation of elementary safety rules also played a tragic role.
Therefore, the prevention of all kinds of "emergencies," including those of a technogenic and "anthropogenic" nature, that is, resulting from the incorrect actions of people, personnel, as well as of a criminal nature, was one of the everyday tasks of the Chekists.
Yes, such a system of prevention at times produced tragic failures that led to accidents and catastrophes with human casualties. But for each such "emergency" there were thousands of prevented incidents and crimes.
And nevertheless, in the 70s and 80s in the USSR there occurred up to 100 "criminal" explosions per year! In the overwhelming majority of cases, without human casualties. And, most importantly, without criminal intent, but as a consequence of careless handling of ammunition and materials, their negligent storage, and violation of safety rules.
And — literally a handful!! — of deliberate criminal acts.
On September 11, 1973, a suicide bomber detonated an explosive device near the mausoleum of V.I. Lenin on Red Square.
In 1976, V.G. Zhvania, previously convicted three times, organized 3 explosions in Tbilisi, Sukhumi and Kutaisi (convicted in 1977). In the same year, an explosion was also organized in the city of Baku (Azerbaijan SSR).
Although there were cases of explosions in other cities as well — Sverdlovsk, Moscow — as a result of which there were even human casualties, although, as it turned out as a result of the investigations, they did not have the character of terrorism.
In the 70s, apparently not without the influence of reports by domestic and foreign media, the character of terrorist manifestations began to change somewhat; even in attempts to seize and hijack aircraft abroad, instead of firearms, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) increasingly began to appear and be used.
Moving on to the tactics of employing "blind," that is, depersonalized, "addressless" terrorism, its initiators counted on sowing fear and panic among the population and provoking its dissatisfaction with the policies and actions of the authorities.
Not infrequently, the preparation of such acts was accompanied by the anonymous advancement of "political" and other "demands."
The KGB organs also checked versions of the possible involvement of foreign intelligence services and anti-Soviet organizations, including émigré organizations linked to intelligence services, in terrorist acts on the territory of our country. And there was the necessary operational data for such suspicions — the indirect connection of the group of a certain S. Zatikyan with one of them was subsequently established by the investigation.
For the comprehensive solution of the tasks of combating terrorism, in September 1977 the Central Scientific Research Institute of Special Research (TsNIISI, also known as the KGB Institute of Criminalistics) was established within the KGB. The institute had an explosives-technical laboratory, on the basis of which a department was later created whose functions include the detection, neutralization and investigation of explosive devices.
In January 1977, the loudest — both literally and figuratively — terrorist acts occurred.
On January 8, 1977, at about 6 o'clock in the evening, three explosions occurred in Moscow: 2 in the area of Red Square on 25th October Street (now Nikolskaya), 1 in the metro, whose victims numbered 7 people, while about 40 were injured.
That same evening the following cipher telegram went out to all KGB organs:
"On January 8 of this year, in the second half of the day in Moscow, unknown persons (person) carried out 3 explosions of great destructive force: in the Moscow metro (at the stations "Izmailovskaya" — "Pervomayskaya"), on 25 Years of October Street (Dzerzhinsky Square, Red Square). There are casualties.
It is necessary to deploy the entire operational staff, all forces, means and other capabilities of the organs and troops of state security for the swiftest detection of the criminals.
Search measures are to be carried out not only on the basis of existing and incoming signals, but also conducted on a broad front at facilities served and not served by the KGB, at airports, at railway stations and in residential areas, proceeding from the assumption that the criminals could have manufactured explosive devices at their place of residence as well.
During the search, clearly define the categories of persons among whom the search must first be conducted. Particular attention should be given to the search among extremist-minded nationalists, persons expressing terrorist and sabotage intentions, those who have taken measures to illegally acquire explosive substances, those previously convicted of especially dangerous state crimes, those subjected to preventive measures by KGB organs, etc.
Report data obtained that merit operational attention to the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
1st Deputy Chairman of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR S.K. Tsvigun."
The terrorists were "tracked down" and detained in early September 1978.
It is also worth touching upon the question of the involvement of foreign intelligence services in terrorist acts.
These include the numerous facts, now public knowledge, of the involvement of the CIA, SIS and the intelligence services of other states in international terrorism, not excluding the preparation, arming and training of bands of "mujahideen" ("warriors of Allah") in Afghanistan. One of such "promising agents" of the CIA was a young Saudi who has now become the "terrorist No. 1 of our time," Osama bin Laden.
At the same time, in the 70-80s of the past century, the "free" foreign press preferred not to spread these topics.
"Terrorist operations to influence public opinion are a normal matter for the CIA," wrote already in 2003 the former minister of the FRG, A. von Bülow, who oversaw the activities of the West German intelligence service in the Bundestag (parliament) and, accordingly, was well informed on these matters, in the book "The CIA and September 11. International Terrorism and the Role of the Secret Services."
Later, the Western public became aware of the facts of the participation of CIA officers not only in concealing information about the preparation of an assassination attempt, but also in the murder of Spanish Prime Minister Luis Carrero Blanco in December 1973 in Madrid, and of the presence of a CIA agent in the "Red Brigades" in Italy, which carried out the kidnapping and murder of Prime Minister A. Moro in 1978... There are also numerous other facts and testimonies of the participation of Western intelligence services, including those of Israel, in the carrying out of terrorist activity.
Not to mention the participation of officers of the US CIA and British SIS, and the intelligence services of other states, in the preparation and training of Afghan "mujahideen," in the organization and planning of their commission of sabotage and terrorist acts against the contingent of Soviet troops in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
As one of the "freshly baked" American experts in the field of "counterterrorism," Mark Sageman, later admitted, in 1987–1989 in Islamabad (Pakistan), he was directly engaged in the preparation, training and support of the activities of Islamist militants, and according to him, "during this time, many mujahideen commanders were under my wing."
The greatest number of signals about terrorist intentions appeared on the eve of the holding in the summer of 1980 in Moscow of the XXII Summer Olympic Games.
For example, on the eve of the Olympics, from the autumn of 1978, the KGB Directorate for the city of Moscow and Moscow Oblast intensified the search for the "bomber" who had been planting explosive devices in Klin, Khimki and other districts of the oblast.
This terrorist, who had terrorized the Moscow region for more than half a year on the eve of the upcoming Olympics, claimed one person as a victim, and several others were wounded.
For the sake of truth, I will also note that in one of J. Barron's books this terrorist — I deliberately do not name this person's surname, because his criminal activity was a consequence of a mental illness, and he has a family and children — is called an "innocent victim" of the Soviet state security organs.
This "underground operative" was sought for about a year. And going on leave, the head of the KGB Directorate for the city of Moscow and Moscow Oblast, V.I. Alidin, wished himself that, upon his return, he would be reported of the arrest of this elusive terrorist.
And on the very first working day, 6 October 1979, his deputy Yuri Mikhailovich Denisov, who had remained "minding the store," joyfully reported:
— Comrade General! Your instruction has been carried out! The terrorist has been found! Arrested, exposed by the evidence obtained during the searches, and is giving testimony!
In the first special report to the CPSU Central Committee, "On the designs of Western intelligence services and foreign anti-Soviet organizations in connection with 'Olympiad-80,'" dated 16 June 1978, the chairman of the KGB noted: "... from one of our sources, information was obtained that in the FRG and a number of other capitalist countries, terrorists are allegedly being trained for infiltration into the USSR during the Olympics as tourists in order to commit terrorist acts."
Information of this kind undoubtedly required the most thorough verification and an appropriate response to potential threats.
In addition, as F. D. Bobkov recalled, long before the 80 Olympics, books by former intelligence officer Robert Vacha in England and James Patterson in the USA came out almost simultaneously, in which, in belletristic form, terrorist acts allegedly committed during the Olympic Games in Moscow were colorfully described, and a detailed "technical description" of the course of their preparation was also contained. In fact, according to specialists' assessments, this was a kind of "instruction for potential terrorists." Which could push extremistically minded and mentally unbalanced persons to commit actions similar to those described.
Naturally, on the basis of this information, a thorough verification was organized and the conditions that could really have been used by malefactors were eliminated.
During the period of preparation for the holding of the games of the XXII Summer Olympiad in Moscow and other cities, the work on preventing terrorist actions consisted of identifying extremistically minded persons who planned to visit our country, and preventing their entry into the USSR, searching for and identifying possible terrorists among entering foreigners, and work on signals, in particular, about the theft and loss of weapons and ammunition, and about harbored hostile intentions.
Not infrequently nowadays, authors writing about the problems of countering the terrorist threat in our country point as a factor opposing it to the existence of the "moral and political unity of the new historical community of people — the Soviet people," which existed in the 60s — 80s of the last century.
Without at all discounting this highly significant socio-psychological factor and phenomenon, the existence of which is confirmed by many empirical sociological studies, let us note only that in that period of time there also existed and functioned quite effectively a system of administrative-permissive regimes, which turned out to be initially deformed, and subsequently — completely dismantled in the early 90s.
And the elimination of this barrier on the path of potential criminals inevitably led to a "criminal collapse" — an unprecedented growth of criminal encroachments on the rights of citizens, including the first among them — the right to life.
Incidentally, readers are well acquainted with the peculiarities of the contemporary criminogenic situation in Russia from their own experience.
From the mid-80s, in connection with changes in the socio-political and operational, criminogenic situation in the country, the number of signals and cases with a terrorist coloring began to increase.
And in August 1985, Afghan mujahideen who had been infiltrated and had legalized themselves in the USSR a year before its opening were preparing to carry out terrorist actions during the holding in Moscow of the international festival of youth and students. (The preparation of the action was suppressed by the KGB of the USSR).
And in September 1985, there followed the seizure by members of one of the Palestinian organizations of four Soviet diplomats in the capital of Lebanon. (Three of them would be released a month later as a result of active operational-search actions organized by the resident of the PGU of the KGB in Beirut, Yu.N. Perfilyev).
In connection with the growing acuteness of the problem of combating international terrorism, on 23 October 1986, the chairman of the KGB, V.M. Chebrikov, delivered a report on this question at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.
In particular, he reported that such a quantity of fissile radioactive materials had been stolen in the world that they would suffice for the manufacture of 10 bombs equal in power to the one dropped on Hiroshima.
The Chairman of the KGB also noted that on the territory of the USSR there were up to 200 anti-Soviet formations with terrorist inclinations, uniting about 3 thousand participants.
Also memorable for the citizens of our country are the seizure of the Tu-154 aircraft on the Irkutsk-Leningrad flight on March 8, 1988, by the Ovechkin family, and the seizure of schoolchildren in the city of Ordzhonikidze on December 2, 1988, by a group led by repeat offender P. Yashkiyants.
In June 1988, the KGB of the USSR prevented an assassination attempt on R. Reagan during his visit to Moscow.
It must be emphasized that for the first time it was publicly stated that the KGB conducts the fight against terrorism, including international terrorism, by V.A. Kryuchkov at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in July 1989.
In an interview published on October 26, 1989, by the Izvestia newspaper, the then chairman of the KGB of the USSR, V.A. Kryuchkov, admitted that in the 70s and 80s, state security agencies had identified and taken preventive measures against more than 1,500 people who harbored terrorist intentions.
The KGB agencies were also engaged in the search for and expulsion from the territory of the USSR of foreigners suspected of involvement in terrorist activity.
In the KGB report on the results of operational and service activity for 1989, the CPSU Central Committee was informed that during the year 130 citizens of the USSR were placed under control in connection with the expression of terrorist intentions, three attempts to seize passenger aircraft were thwarted, and the behavior of 140 citizens who had expressed intentions to seize aircraft was monitored.
Entry into the USSR was denied to 384 foreigners who were members of international terrorist organizations. On the basis of the information obtained, another 899 foreign citizens were placed under entry control.
In conclusion, it seems necessary to name the heads of the counterterrorism unit of the 5th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, thanks to whose restraint and skill Soviet people lived for many years without knowing fear, without fearing for the life and safety of their family and loved ones.
It was successively headed by colonels:
— Chirikov Lev Nikolayevich — subsequently major general, who headed the KGB of the Bashkir ASSR and became deputy chief of the 5th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR (in July-August 1980 he directed the Security Service of the Olympic Village in the South-West of Moscow);
— major general Zvezdenskov Valentin Vladimirovich (subsequently first deputy chairman of the KGB of the Lithuanian SSR);
— lieutenant general Golovin Vladimir Aleksandrovich (chairman of the KGB of the Uzbek SSR);
— Zyazin Yevgeny Dmitrievich, veteran of the Great Patriotic War, holder of the Order of Glory[24].
The invaluable experience of countering terrorism acquired under their leadership, literally earned through sweat and blood, is still in demand today by employees of state security agencies in many countries of the world. And this should not be forgotten when looking back at our relatively recent past.
Forecasting likely threats to the country's security prompted the new leadership of the Ministry of Security of Russia
(MBR) to organize on June 18, 1992, an interdepartmental scientific and practical conference devoted to the search for optimal measures and methods of preventing and suppressing terrorist manifestations.
Let us note that in September 2005, in a report by the London Centre for the Study of Conflict at the Royal Military Academy, it was emphasized that, unexpectedly for our Western colleagues in the international anti-terrorist coalition, "Russia possesses unique experience in countering terrorism, but this experience and potential were to a significant extent underestimated by its foreign partners."